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The time is 1945; the place is Macy's department store in New York 
City. As the elevator reaches the fifth floor, the operator announces 
what can be found at this level: "Ladies' girdles, gentlemen's socks, 
airplanes, and household appliances."' True enough, customers could 
purchase there the two-seater Ercoupe, an all-metal plane with a tricycle 
landing gear and a simplified control system, an airplane for Everyman. 
The end of World War Two was supposed to usher in the new age of 
aviation in America that would make the personal airplane nearly as 
common as the personal automobile, and indeed, in 1946, five times as 
many private planes were sold than in any previous year, over 33,000. 
But then the boom ended abruptly. Sales fell by half in 1947, and by 
half again in 1948. By 1950, the dream of a plane in every garage was 
dead, and it was clear that the twentieth century, the century of flight, 
would be one in which commercial airlines dominated the skies. 
The golden age of romance for private aviation lasted not quite 25 
years, from Charles Lindbergh's 1927 transatlantic solo to the collapse 
of the impractical vision at mid-century. This golden age was not marked 
by sales of private planes, since the technology did not exist in the 20s, 
the necessary prosperity did not exist in the 30s, and the war postponed 
the dream in the first half of the 40s. No, this period was distinguished 
by faith in the redeeming and ennobling qualities of flight. Flying was 
good and that was that. It was a saving force in a grubby world, allowing 
men for the first time to rise above the inequities and meanness of the 
earth, just as angels did. Flight itself would give man a new freedom, 
and flight in one's own airplane would signify the ultimate freedom. 
The dream failed because the dream was wrong. Flight was not the 
salvation of man or even the guiding force to a morally as well as 
materially superior world. Flight was simply the best way to move people 
swiftly over great distances. Today the dream has been resurrected in a 
vastly improved form. Air travel today is cheaper, faster, safer, more 
comfortable, more usual, and immensely more democratic than the early 
prophets of flight could have imagined. Realism and utility have replaced 
romance and adventure. The agent of this transformation is the com- 
mercial airline and not the private airplane. Still, the fundamental 
struggle to sustain the dream of freedom common to both private and 
commercial aviation continues: how free should the air be? 
The arbiters of this question have been the United States government 
and the American airlines themselves. In a reversal of traditional tend- 
encies in other fields of business, frequently it has been the government 
that has argued for less control, and the airlines for more. Usually the 
interests of the government and the airlines coincided. The government 
wanted an effective and stable aviation network, essentially serving 
American business at home and American foreign policy abroad, while 
the airlines sought to preserve their sheltered status as regulated carriers 
with artificial fare structures and restricted competition. Wanting to keep 
their official shield, the airlines have been sensitive to the government's 
desires, for until 1978, it was the government, through precious route 
awards, that protected the airlines from potentially ruinous competition. 
This has meant that the airlines served as unofficial instruments of 
national policy. 
It is not that the government has been casual and uncaring about the 
airline industry, at least not since 1930. On the contrary, the federal 
government recognizes the crucial importance of airlines and their sup- 
pliers in a'number of important ways, starting with national security. 
After all, the first sale Orville and Wilbur Wright made was to the 
military. America's international airlines have traditionally done the 
work the government would prefer not to be seen doing, or believes can 
be better done by private companies. The symbolic as well as real 
importance of America's presence, power, and technical expertise as 
expressed through American airliners parked at the ramps of foreign 
airports is evident, just as the first acts of an emerging nation seem to 
be to design a national flag and create a national airline.2 
America has been one of the very few countries without an official 
national flag-carrier, which it has found not only a contradiction of - 
American free enterprise principles, but unnecessary practically. 
America's commercial airlines carried the flag, established new Ameri- 
can-dominated outposts around the world, and exploited more than one 
South American economy. Pan American World Airways in particular 
served as an unofficial state department in all parts of the globe. With 
the private sector functioning so well, imposing little burden on the 
federal bureaucracy, budget, or conscience, there has been no need 
to create a government-dominated airline, like Britain's well-named 
Imperial Airways, which was the agent of empire along what is called 
the "all-red" route. More recently the CIA used cover companies in 
Indo-China. Air America was created to fight the North Vietnamese, 
and the U.S. carrier Continental Airlines was prevailed upon to set 
up Continental Air Services in Laos. The latter delivered not only 
conventional foodstuffs, but also "heavy rice," a euphemism for weapons 
and munitions. 
Of course, the economic stakes are too large to be ignored by the 
government. The country is dependent, psychologically and economi- 
cally, on commercial aviation. America's airlines fly about 40% of the 
world's passengers. American airframe and engine manufacturers are 
incomparably the world's largest. Today, aircraft and engine sales 
account for more than half of America's exports, a particularly critical 
area, and one with considerable long-range potential, since it is estimated 
that the world's airlines will require 4,000 new passenger aircraft by 
1993. Boeing alone makes over half of the world's jet transports. The only 
high-technology industry apart from data processing in which America is 
still the leader is manufacturing  airplane^.^ All of these economic activi- 
ties operate today in a free-market environment, and one that the United 
States is willing to protect by international diplomacy, as it did in 1986 
by accusing Airbus Industrie of unfair practice because of government 
subsidization of the four-nation consortium. Boeing is allowed a virtual 
monopoly because no one can see a sensible alternative. During the 
1973-74 oil crisis, Pan American and TWA conferred about transatlantic 
flight capacity and no one in the anti-trust division murmured about 
collu~ion.~ 
The government will intrude into this Adam Smith Garden of Eden 
only when absolutely necessary. In 1971, Rolls-Royce went broke 
making the RB.211 engine for Lockheed's TriStar jet, and as a result 
Lockheed faced bankruptcy. The only solution was for the federal 
government to guarantee a vital loan for Lockheed so that the L-1011 
program could continue. In effect, the American government solved a 
problem created by the British. This celebrated bail-out worked, and 
not only for the British. One hundred thousand American jobs were 
saved, and the loan was repaid, together with a 31 million dollar fee to 
the U.S. Treasury. 
Nevertheless, government intervention is clearly a last resort. The 
House of Representatives passed the Lockheed bail-out measure by 
three votes, the Senate by one. True, the federal lending institution that 
encourages sales abroad, the Export-Import bank, has recently used up 
to half its funds to secure overseas sales of American aircraft, but it is 
also true that most financing of overseas aircraft and engine purchases 
is arranged through private American banks. It is not only in jest that 
airline people make the statement that "Citibank owns the largest fleet 
of airplanes in the world outside the Soviet U n i ~ n . " ~  America does not 
have a federal agency to guide and advise, like the Japanese Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), and apparently it does not 
want one. 
For nearly a quarter of a century after Kitty Hawk, planes were 
too small, could lift too little, and went too slowly to be much good 
commercially. As late as 1922, people sometimes ran down the street 
after  airplane^.^ In fact, passenger airlines were not profitable until 1936, 
with the introduction of the 21-seat DC-3. What filled the gap and 
created revenue for the airlines which began to spring up in the middle 
and late 1920s was carrying air mail. 
Ironically, it was the railroads which gave commercial aviation its first 
big boost, two years before Lindbergh. The Post Office threatened to 
resume carrying its own mail, and the railroads, faced with the loss of 
steady and substantial income, met part of the challenge by advocating 
federal air mail contracts. Evidently they were willing to sacrifice a small 
part of their mail freight to keep government out of the transportation 
business. 
The railroads' effort was only partly successful, for in fact at this point 
the federal government for the first time became seriously interested in 
commercial aviation. Herbert Hoover was the Secretary of Commerce 
from 1921 to 1926, and he understood that encouraging passenger traffic, 
which was in the national interest but certain to be a financial loser in 
the immediate future, could be stimulated only by providing commercial 
airlines with a steady income in the form of air mail contracts. All sides 
encouraged Hoover to gather responsibility for commercial air transport 
to his department. Hoover agreed, eager to apply his corporatist phil- 
osophy and have the government become a cooperative and not an 
adversarial partner in private business. In 1925, the Air Mail Act, usually 
called the Kelly Act, was passed. America, which did not have a single 
regularly scheduled air transport line as late as 1924, was, because of 
government stimulation of private business, on its way into the f ~ t u r e . ~  
Of course the public benefited from more rapid delivery, though 
service at first was erratic. Trains were often faster and always more 
reliable; air mail users soon developed the habit of sending a duplicate 
letter by surface mail for insurance. The real beneficiaries of the Kelly 
Act, however, were the airlines themselves, for an air mail contract 
amounted to a federal subsidy, encouraging the first growth of airlines 
without direct, or even apparent, government control. Eddie Rick- 
enbacker's Florida Airways rarely had a passenger to sit in one of its 
plane's wicker seats, but it could stay alive by having its agents air mail 
wrapped bricks to each other and earn a 100% p r ~ f i t . ~  Without an air 
mail contract, an airline could not survive for long. With that implicit 
subsidy, nascent air transport companies were able to trace the first lines 
of commercial air service over the map of America, and become the 
homesteaders of the skies. 
Thus, the work of starting a successful airline usually began not in 
some remote hangar with a pilot or two in white silk scarves and a World 
War One surplus plane, but in Washington. The acknowledged master 
of lobbying for air mail contracts by using his superb persuasive and 
negotiating talents (as well as his old boy network from Yale) was the 
founder of Pan American, Juan Trippe. "He was referred to as a robber 
baron and a buccaneer, albeit a gentleman of the species," says one of 
his biographers,1° and he had much in common with the railroad tycoons 
of the late nineteenth century. Pan American's first route carried the 
mail and a few passengers between Key West and Havana, a good- 
weather route where it competed against an opponent it had a chance 
of beating, the steamship. 
Having given the necessary push to get the airlines literally off the 
ground, the government did little more. When the ancestor of TWA, 
TAT, pioneered coast-to-coast air/rail service in 1929, it had to build its 
own landing fields and terminals west of Wichita. Passenger planes then 
did not fly at night. When the first two TAT Ford trimotors inaugurated 
regular service, 5,000 people in Port Columbus, Ohio, turned out in the 
rain to watch nineteen passengers walk from train to planes. The first 
leg of the return journey was piloted by Lindbergh himself (TAT was 
called "The Lindbergh Line," and Amelia Earhart was also employed 
by the company for promotional purposes), but not before Gloria 
Swanson and Mary Pickford christened the plane. The one-way ticket 
price was between $337 and $403. To give an example of how much this 
was in 1929 dollars, a stuntman in the 1920s charged only $1,500 for 
blowing up his plane in midair and then parachuting, and a crash was a 
bargain at $1,200. Half the passengers became airsick (fortunately in 
those days airplane windows opened), and many blacked out from 
oxygen deficiency when the planes crossed the Rocky Mountains. When 
everything worked, the trip took 48 hours. No wonder many people 
thought TAT, which actually stood for Transcontinental Air Transport, 
really meant "Take a Train."ll No wonder airlines preferred to fly the 
mail, which was profitable and never complained, threw up, or passed 
out. 
On far different grounds, one compelling voice did complain about 
America's air transport system, Herbert Hoover's Postmaster General, 
Walter Folger Brown. As early as 1929, America was the world's leader 
in commercial aviation, and both Hoover and Brown were intent on 
rationalizing the crazy-quilt national air network, and stimulating pass- 
enger traffic. It was, in fact, part of Brown's job to encourage commercial 
aviation, and he moved like a steamroller to do so. He designed an 
amendment to the Kelly Act (this called the Watres Act) that sailed 
through Congress in late April, 1930. The underlying purpose of the bill 
was to force consolidation of small companies into large ones able to fly 
coast-to-coast, and to choke off the remaining small companies by 
drastically cutting their air mail subsidies. No monopolist, he saw cor- 
rectly that the public would be better served by competition among 
several strong national airlines rather than a ragtag assemblage of small 
ones. Just sixteen days after the Watres Act passed, the so-called "Spoils 
Conferences" began, in which the prize long-distance mail routes were 
awarded, and much of America's commercial aviation future decided. 
Small or new companies had virtually no chance to compete against 
Brown's wishes, especially given the impossibly short notice for bids to 
be submitted, and the Watres Act's provision for protecting pioneering 
airlines. Brown was no hero to the established airlines already carrying 
the mail, either. Airlines seem to inspire in their organizers and 
employees the same loyalty and emotionalism as do some universities, 
and most simply did not want to merge with competitors. In addition, 
Brown cut their air mail revenue to force them to turn-to passengers in 
order to make up the loss. 
Four major air mail routes were granted at the Spoils Conferences, 
and the companies that won the plums constituted the Big Four of 
domestic airlines for commercial aviation's formative years: TWA, 
American, United, and Eastern. By using its economic muscle, the 
government was able to forge a modern and efficient route structure 
operated by private and competing airlines.12 
Overseas, the matter was entirely different. Most Washington adminis- 
trations were content to have Trippe's Pan Am represent U.S. interests 
abroad, and as America's only international airline until the mid-40s, it 
became the country's unofficial flag-carrier. Though government was 
never entirely comfortable with Trippe and his monopoly, one suspects 
the politicans and bureaucrats preferred to do business with the devil 
they knew, and besides, it was easier to keep an eye on one international 
carrier rather than several. Abroad, Pan Am became an informal foreign 
ministry with Trippe as its ambassador. It was a distinction he fought 
for fiercely and with unparalleled success, since his ambition was always 
that Pan Am should be "the chosen instrument" of the American 
government in international aviation. As early as 1929, Trippe had his 
advertising agency create the impression that Pan Am was a quasi- 
governmental company, and in fact it was, though hardly as the public 
perceived it to be. 
The interests of the State Department and the Foreign Service on one 
hand and those of Pan Am on the other were usually seen to be 
synonymous. Personnel from these overseas government branches were 
frequently used as errand boys for Pan Am,13 while the airline was 
implicitly charged with extending America's influence wherever planes 
could fly. In 1987, airlines have a glut of aircraft in search of destinations. 
In America in 1937, the situation was the reverse; only a quarter of 
municipal airports had scheduled services.14 Trippe's situation in the 
mid-1930s combined the worst elements of both examples. Usually 
he had no destinations requesting service, no landing rights until he 
negotiated them, no facilities until he built them, no long-range planes 
to cross oceans nonstop, and no reliable overwater navigation system. 
His method was to attack all these problems simultaneously, ordering 
planes, facilities, and navigational equipment even as he was maneu- 
vering with foreign governments and his own. That he was able to do 
so much so quickly is splendid testimony to his two major talents: truly 
visionary foresight and magnificent negotiating skill. He used both to 
earn government favoritism and engage in sometimes ruthless gov- 
ernment-supported predatory actions, winning quick approval of his 
requests in Washington and enjoying quiet and unofficial U.S. support 
abroad. 
Trippe expanded Pan Am first through the Caribbean and Central 
America and then along the coasts of South America. Then, in the 
1930s, he led his airline in daring leaps across the world's oceans. First 
he bridged the North Pacific by creating bases at Honolulu, Midway, 
Wake, Guam, Manila, and finally Hong Kong. With expansionist plans 
of their own, the Japanese saw Pan Am's ever-stretching route network 
as a provocative threat to their own ambitions. The American govern- 
ment was happy to maintain an ostensibly neutral stance while allowing 
a private company to build island facilities that could be transformed 
into island bases when the need arose. 
Trippe invented Wake Island. He was desperate for a landing area 
between Midway and Guam. His flying boats could just make the 2,400 
miles between the West Coast and Hawaii; the 3,000 miles between 
Midway and Guam was too far - farther in fact than it was across the 
North Atlantic, which, because of distance as well as politics, made it 
the last major oceanic route to be established, in 1939. Trippe went to 
the New York Public Library on 42nd Street and searched maps futilely, 
until, in the logs of nineteenth century clipper captains, he found Wake 
Island mentioned.15 Although America had annexed Wake in 1889, 
when Trippe went to Washington he could find no agency responsible 
for it. Since it was a tiny, uninhabited, shadeless, and waterless atoll 
that stood only a dozen feet above high tide, there had been nothing to 
be responsible for. l6 But Trippe saw that it had just what his flying boats 
needed: a sheltered lagoon and a little land in just the right place in an 
otherwise empty sea. A ship carried American workers to Wake with 
all the supplies they would need for a year, coral heads were blasted, a 
prefabricated village erected, and the first passengers arrived in 1935 
aboard the China Clipper to find a comforable hotel manned by white- 
jacketed stewards, electricity, and hot water in the baths. As well as 
establishing bases for his flying boats, Trippe created targets for the 
Japanese in 1941, who struck at Wake and Midway just hours after 
hitting Pearl Harbor. 
From 1939 onward the government was seriously concerned about the 
Axis attacking the Panama Canal or even America itself through South 
and Central America. Only 1,900 miles separated enemy-dominated 
Africa from Brazil, and millions of first- and second-generation Italians 
and Germans lived in South America. The Colombian airline, SCADTA, 
seemed a particular threat, both because it operated within a few hours' 
flying time of the canal, and because its pilots were German or even 
Luftwaffe-trained. The airline's formal name itself indicates the close 
connection: Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes ACreos, and 
its working language was not Spanish but German. The American 
government turned to Trippe and asked if he could find a way to oust 
the Germans from SCADTA. What the government did not know at 
the time was that SCADTA was secretly owned by Pan American. This 
is eminently characteristic of Trippe; he was a secretive man, and he 
constantly sought control of foreign airlines for the good of Pan Am. 
Acting under heavy government pressure, Trippe secretly ferried 
replacement American crews and managers to Colombia, and then when 
all was in place, had the Germans fired en masse.17 
Soon after, Trippe was asked by Franklin Roosevelt to do a much 
larger job. The government required a string of aircraft bases in Latin 
America, but as a non-belligerent in 1939, it could hardly claim military 
necessity in negotiations with twenty different Latin nations, some with 
Axis sympathies, for permission to build the bases. Many New Dealers, 
led by Roosevelt himself and by Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. 
Berle, Jr., were actually Trippe's adversaries1' and wanted Pan Am's 
power reduced, but in this case as in so many others, they had no choice. 
Roosevelt had to plead with Trippe for construction of 25 land bases, 
nine seaplane bases - 52 projects in all - to be built by Pan Am and 
ostensibly for Pan Am's use, but with government funds and actually 
for future military use. For the government it meant using Pan Am's 
expertise in Latin America, as well as using Pan Am as a convenient 
front. For Pan Am, it meant extending their monopoly, and having U.S. 
government-financed facilities abroad for Pan Am's exclusive use when 
the war ended. 
Another foreign airline Pan Am owned was the China National 
Aviation Corporation. It was always a ragged airline (even its inaugural 
flight crashed!), but it served a need for China that was met in no other 
way, and, not incidentally, it was always very profitable for its parent, 
Pan Am. Through the skill and devotion of its manager, William L. 
Bond, CNAC kept flying throughout the war, its route constantly con- 
stricting as the Japanese conquered more cities. Finally, CNAC was the 
Nationalist government's only link with the outside world, flying from 
Hong Kong through Canton to the wartime capital of Chungking. To 
avoid Japanese fighters, CNAC could not announce departure times, 
and flew only at night, with no weather reports and with no ground 
navigation signals. When a CNAC plane became history's first com- 
mercial transport to be shot down by hostile aircraft, the plane was 
hauled out of the river, rebuilt, and flown again. When a DC-3 had a 
wing shot off, a DC-2's wing was grafted on in its place, and the world's 
only DC-2$ was born. 
China trusted Pan American more than it did the American ambassa- 
dor, and so when Trippe visited Chiang Kai-shek in 1947, the Gen- 
eralissimo gave him a secret plan to save China that Trippe was supposed 
to carry directly to President Harry Truman. Trippe conferred first with 
General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, then with Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall, and finally with Truman himself, who was so 
suspicious of Chiang by that time that nothing came of the secret 
scheme. l9 
There was a single notable exception when the government tried to 
take business from the airlines. When the Roosevelt Democrats swept 
into power, they took a hard look at the awards made during the 
Spoils Conferences. An investigation headed by Senator Hugo Black of 
Alabama found that Postmaster Brown's competitive bidding system 
had been certainly unfair and probably illegal, and that some airlines 
and their stockholders had profited handsomely because of favoritism. 
In February, 1934, Roosevelt cancelled all air mail contracts and assigned 
the Army the task of transporting the mail, a task it did not want. At 
this time, 60% of the airlines' income was derived from carrying air mail. 
Roosevelt's action was at worst a death threat to the airlines, and at best 
a serious reversal for commercial aviation. Lindbergh railed, Fortune 
magazine screamed, Rickenbacker dourly predicted disaster, and TWA 
furloughed its entire airline. Rickenbacker was right; the Army, inex- 
perienced and given little chance to prove itself, was not up to the job. 
Ten pilots died during the experiment, four while actually flying the 
mail, six others in related incidents. Roosevelt was forced to suspend air 
mail service for a week while the Army tried to recover. It was shown 
that it cost the Army $2.21 a pound to deliver the mail, while it cost the 
airlines only 54 cents a pount, although the Army covered little more 
than half the airlines' air mail mileage. 
Finally, for practical and political reasons, Roosevelt had to retreat. 
A new law wa~~rushed through, the Air Mail Act of 1934, and competitive 
bidding for air mail routes was re-opened. One stipulation of the new 
law was that no participant in the 1930 Spoils Conferences could bid 
again, but that was only a bit of window dressing. It was made clear that 
the original airlines simply had to incorporate under new names to join 
the competition, and thdt is how American Airways became American 
Airlines, United Aircraft & Transport became United Air Lines, and so 
forth. When the new routes were awarded (once again at slightly reduced 
rates), they looked very much like the old routes, usually with the same 
companies flying to the same destinations. By early June, the airlines 
were flying the mail again. The only permanent change brought about 
by the whole affair was that airplane manufacturers were permanently 
separated from airline companies. The government had certainly learned 
of wrongdoing in the airlines and in government, and it had also learned 
that private companies could do the job faster, cheaper, and safer. 
Judging from Washington's reluctance in the intervening half-century 
to tamper further with the airlines' prerogatives, it was a lesson not 
forgotten.20 
Probably the best example of this came right after Pearl Harbor when 
Roosevelt was about to nationalize the airlines for the duration of the 
war. He was quickly persuaded by the president of the Air Transport 
Association that the airlines already had a volunteer mobilization plan, 
and that it would be more effective to allow the companies to operate 
their own aircraft for the government. 
Even during the war, debate began on what course the world's airlines 
should take in the postwar period, when planes would have, dramatically 
increased their range. The question was simply put: should the skies be 
as free as the seas, or should every country guard its aerial borders 
zealously, protecting the monopoly of their own national airlines? Wen- 
dell Wilkie flew around the world and then published One World in 
1943. Roosevelt's Vice-president, Henry Wallace, suggested the United 
Nations be responsible for an open skies policy through its own "air 
arm." It was reminiscent of a proposal made in 1929 that the League 
of Nations maintain the "Silver Wings of Peace," which would drop 
conciliatory leaflets on contentious nations (and then bomb them if they 
did not pay proper attention).'l All this was too much for free enterprise 
Republicans like the Pan Am staff and a new member of the House of 
Representatives, Clare Boothe Luce. She devoted her maiden speech in 
the House to denouncing Wallace's global thinking as "globaloney." She 
stood foursquare for national capitalism, with government protection 
from competition, especially foreign competition. Trippe and Sam Pryor, 
one of Pan Am's ranking officials, had tutored her at length before the 
speech. 22 
Today, almost all nations agree with Mrs. Luce's view. The evidence 
is everywhere, and it has names like SAS, Lufthansa, Japan Air Lines, 
and Air France. These airlines, in fact virtually all the world's airlines, 
serve nations that favor air transport monopolies. They are protected by 
their own trade organization whose rules have the force of a multilateral 
treaty, the International Air Transport Association, or IATA. IATA is 
an international regulatory body that fixes fares, specifies what passenger 
amenities are allowed in which classes (for example, who pays for 
headsets and who does not), and controls traffic so that all carriers have 
a chance to make a profit, whether they deserve to or not. While 35 
airlines have refused to join the tariff setting branch of IATA, among 
them Singapore Airlines and Aeroflot, 85 others meet regularly to 
exercise what IATA terms "tariff coordination." IATA unites about 120 
airlines employing close to a million people into a giant cartel. It makes 
international air transport one of the most regulated and one of the least 
competitive industries in the world. 
An exception to that statement is the route between Europe and 
America, because in recent years, America's airlines, reflecting govern- 
ment policies and the economic reality of over-capacity, have become 
mavericks, forcing reduced fares over the North Atlantic. In 1974, 
Washington refused Laker a licence to operate in the U.S. In 1977, 
under the new Carter administration's program to deregulate America 
and encourage competition, Laker was welcomed. Laker's Skytrain 
service soon became the sixth-largest airline over the Atlantic. Later, 
after collusion among major North Atlantic carriers helped force Laker 
out of business, an anti-trust suit brought by Laker was successful. 
Several airlines had to indemnify Laker directly, and in 1986, three 
(British Airways, TWA, and Pan Am) had to offer certain of their 1982- 
1984 passengers $30,000,000 in travel coupons to compensate for their 
predatory acts. 
The 1977 Laker ruling was only a portent of the radical change that 
was to come. In 1978, Jimmy Carter followed the traditional Democratic 
tendency of fostering airline competition by sponsoring the landmark 
Airline Deregulation Act. In the words of John Newhouse, author 
of The Sporty Game, "Congress, in deregulating the airline industry, 
accepted the proposition that it resembles a universe of corner grocery 
stores more than it does a public Airlines were perceived to 
be offering almost the same product, with identical planes flying identical 
routes, leading to a purity of competition that the government wanted 
judged in the only remaining sensible terms, price and service. 
Deregulation means that fares can follow the market as competition 
and traffic patterns dictate, or there can be no fare at all, as happened 
when the late Air Florida ran a promotion giving seats away for a kiss. 
It also means that routes can be initiated or terminated at an airline's 
discretion, without prior approval of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
Indeed, the Deregulation Act legislated the CAB out of existence on 
January 1, 1985. Airline deregulation has changed not only America's 
airlines, but travel patterns in America, and hence America itself. 
Passengers experienced two dramatic changes because of dereg- 
ulation. First, fares generally decreased on densely travelled, long- 
distance routes, but rose on shorter, less profitable segments. This 
continues the American pattern whereby it is easier and perhaps more 
attractive to live in large cities as distance becomes measured not by 
miles or time, but by convenience, and, especially, money. Second, after 
an initial period when new airlines blossomed like flowers in the spring, 
today airline consolidation so steadily reduces the number of carriers 
that an oligopoly is threatened. Thus, the government intervention of 
Postmaster Brown and the government permissiveness of the Carter 
and Reagan years could lead to the same result: the establishment of 
something like the dominant Big Four airlines of half a century ago. 
In his book of the same name, Joseph J. Corn brilliantly delineates 
"the winged gospel," which was the belief in the first half of this century 
that the airplane would be a major instrument of beneficial social change 
in America, a mechanical Messiah of the air. The airplane was associated 
with omnipotence and immortality, so that the winged gospel often 
sounds like the Christian gospel which prefigured it. The sordid earth 
would be left below, and man would be morally and even artistically 
inspired and improved by his first view from the heavens. The plane 
would promote peace by bringing people closer together, and if that did 
not work, it would be a deterrent to war. It would earn for humanity 
freedom from oppressors, especially those who ran governments and 
railroads. Discrimination, especially against women, would be ended. 
Humans would even be healthier as the new "air type" developed, led 
by "the winged superchildren of tomorrow." In 1929 in Miami, an 
expectant mother who went into labor rushed not to the hospital but to 
the airport so she could give birth at 1,200 feet. The infant was named 
"Aerogene." Privilege would be eliminated, as, for example, when 
jockeys raced planes instead of horses and everyone could watch the fun 
for nothing. It was all very earnest and idealistic, and especially in 
retrospect, pretty silly.24 
What was not silly was the cornerstone of the winged gospel, which 
prophesied that airplanes would lead to a more democratic society, that 
everyone would fly. Today, everybody who wants to does, and that 
simple fact is transforming American society. In the postwar period, and 
especially since the jet age began in late 1958, America has enterqd her 
maturity in commercial aviation. The point of the airplane is to move 
people and goods, and today that is being done cheaper, faster, safer, 
and more competitively than ever before. The winged gospel was wrong 
because it saw private planes as its basis. While the government had 
only moderate interest in private aviation, it saw the necessity for strong 
domestic and international airlines that served national goals within an 
ever-shifting, yet subtly directed, ostensibly laissez faire framework. 
Recent history shows that America's airlines are the realistic realization 
of the modern winged gospel, which demands that commercial air 
transport serve the national purpose within a traditional American 
economic and political paradigm. 
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